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CASENOTES

Arizona v. Evans: Carving Out Another
Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule
In Arizona v. Evans,1 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized
incident to an arrest, when the arrest resulted from inaccurate computer
data created by court personnel.2 In January 1991, police arrested
Isaac Evans during a routine traffic stop because the patrol car's
computer indicated he was the subject of an outstanding misdemeanor
While being handcuffed, Evans dropped a marijuana
warrant.'
cigarette. 4 A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a bag of
marijuana hidden under the passenger seat, and Evans was charged
with possession.5 Upon notifying the justice court of the arrest, the
officers discovered the misdemeanor warrant had been quashed
seventeen days earlier.6 Evans moved to suppress the evidence, alleging
the seizure resulted from an illegal search incident to an unlawful
1.
2.
3.
4.

115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
Id. at 1187-88.
Id. at 1188.
Id.

5. Id.
6. Id.
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arrest 7 Evans further contended that, under United States v. Leon,8 the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.9 The arrest,
Evans alleged, was not caused by judicial error, but by police error.' °
The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding the State was at
fault for failing to quash the warrant." The court made no factual
finding as to whether the sheriff's office or the justice court was
responsible for the error." Instead, the court found no "'distinction
between State action, whether it happens to be the police department or
not.'"'3 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
ruling.14 According to the court of appeals, the exclusionary rule was
not intended to deter errors by justice court employees or sheriff's office
employees who were not directly associated with the arresting officers
or their police department."5 The court reasoned that the computer
clerical error was outside the control of the arresting officers' police
department.'
Therefore, the threat of exclusion would not deter the
justice court employees or sheriff's office employees from making similar
mistakes in the future.'7 The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the
distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement
personnel and similar errors committed by court employees and
therefore reversed."8 The court found that regardless of who erred, the
exclusionary rule was "useful" and "proper" when negligent recordkeeping resulted in an unlawful arrest." The United States Supreme Court

7. Id.
8. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding the good-faith exception applies when a judicial officer
erred in issuing a search warrant upon which police objectively and reasonably acted).
9. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
10. Id. Evans also argued that regardless of who erred, whether a court clerk or
sheriff's clerk, exclusion was appropriate because it would further the purpose for which
the exclusionary rule was designed; it would encourage employees to take more care in
making sure quashed warrants were removed from their records. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting State v. Evans, No. CR-91-00513, at 5 (Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa
County 1992)).
14. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 866 P.2d 869
(Ariz. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
15. 836 P.2d at 1027.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869,872 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Arizona v. Evans, 115
S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
19. 866 P.2d at 872. The Arizona Supreme Court stated, "it is repugnant to the

principles of a free society that a person should ever be taken into police custody because
of a computer error precipitated by government carelessness." Id. at 871. It reasoned that
the exclusionary rule would "hopefully serve to improve the efficacy of those who keep
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granted certiorari and reversed the Arizona Supreme Court.2" The
Court held the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence
when police relied in good-faith upon misinformation caused by computer
clerical error.2
The exclusionary rule was first applied to federal criminal proceedings
in 1914.22 In Weeks v. United States, 23 the Court held the Fourth
Amendment barred illegally obtained evidence from being admitted
against defendants. 24 The Court explained that by admitting illegally
obtained evidence, courts would be permitting conduct that violated the
Constitution. 2' Thus, through exclusion, the Court furthered the
promotion of judicial integrity.2' Following Weeks, the Court in Mapp
v. Ohio27 held the exclusionary rule was a mandatory remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations in state proceedings as well.2" The Court
based its holding upon the constitutional foundation established in Wolf
v. Colorado.28 In Wolf, the Court held the Fourth Amendment's right
of privacy extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.30
The Court in Mapp found it "logically and constitutionally necessary"
that the exclusionary rule also apply to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was "an

records in our criminal justice system." Id. at 872.

20. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189, 1194.
21. Id. at 1194. The Court refused to accept the Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion
that "'even assuming... that responsibility for the error rested with the justice court, it
[did] not follow that the exclusionary rule should be inapplicable to these facts.'" Id. at
1193 (quoting Evans, 866 P.2d at 871). Yet, the Court explicitly declined to answer the
question of "whether evidence should be suppressed if police personnel were responsible
for the error." Id. at 1194 n.5.
22. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
23. Id. at 383.
24. Id. at 398.
25. Id. at 394.
26. Id. at 392. The Court wrote:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts, which are charged.., with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id.
27. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28. Id. at 660.
29. See id. at 650-57 (re-examining Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in
part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
30. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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essential part of the right to privacy."3 l The Court not only recognized
the rule as an implicit constitutional privilege, but reiterated the judicial
integrity rationale of Weeks. 2 The Court cited the deterrence of police
misconduct as a third rationale for the rule.3" The Court reasoned that

exclusion would compel police officers to respect Fourth Amendment
guarantees." In subsequent decisions, the Court rejected all but the
police deterrence rationale of Weeks and Mapp. 5 The exclusionary rule
was also narrowed by the adoption of numerous good-faith exceptions.
For example, in United States v. Leon,3" the Court held the exclusionary rule did not apply to good-faith seizures of evidence even if the
search warrant was later found unsupported by probable cause. 7 The
Court limited its analysis to three factors: (1) whether the application
of the exclusionary rule will deter police misconduct; (2) whether
evidence indicates that those responsible for the error are "inclined to
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among
these actors requires . ... the extreme sanction;"" and (3) whether
excluding evidence will have a significant deterrent effect on those
responsible for the error. 9 First, the Court concluded the rule's
application to judicial errors would not deter police misconduct.40 It
reasoned that police were not normally expected to second-guess judicial
officers' decisions.4 1 "[Qince the warrant issues, there is literally
31. 367 U.S. at 656. The Court reasoned:
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches--state or federal-it was logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part of the right to privacy-be
also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf case.
Id. at 655-56.
32. Id. at 656, 660.
33. Id. at 656.
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960)).
35. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485, 486 (1976) (explicitly limiting the rationale
for the exclusionary rule's application to the deterrence of unlawful police conduct while
rejecting any notion that the rule acted as a personal constitutional right of an aggrieved
party); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 355 (1974). The Court stated
that the exclusionary rule was a judicially created remedy aimed at deterring police
misconduct, not a personal constitutional right of an accused. Id. at 347. It also expressly
rejected the dissent's concern that the Court's decision would betray the imperative of
judicial integrity and sanction illegal government conduct. Id. at 355.
36. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
37. Id. at 900.
38. Id. at 916.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 919-21.
41. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984).
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nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the
law."42 Second, the Court found no evidence indicating judicial officers
were inclined to subvert or disregard the Fourth Amendment.4" Third,
and most importantly, the Court concluded that the threat of exclusion
could not significantly deter judicial officers' errors."
The Court
reasoned that judges and magistrates were not law enforcement team
adjuncts but were neutral parties."' Accordingly, they had no stake in
the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.4 6 The Court further
emphasized that exclusion would not "necessarily meaningfully inform
judicial officers of their errors."4 7 Instead, the existing district court
supervision and the threat of removal for misconduct or incompetency,
for example, provided a more effective remedy.4 Three years later, the
Court used its Leon analysis in Illinois v. Krull49 to expand the goodfaith exception.5' The Court held that the exception applied when an
officer objectively and reasonably relied upon a statute authorizing a
warrantless search even though the statute was ultimately declared
unconstitutional.5 1
In Arizona v. Evans, decided eight years after Krull, the Court again
addressed the question of whether to carve out a new good-faith

42. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring)
(brackets in original)).
43. Id. at 916.
44. Id. at 916-17.
45. Id. at 917.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Court also stated, "admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
while at the same time declaring ... the warrant defective ... [would not] in any way
reduce judicial officers' professional incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment,
encourage them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all colorable warrant
requests." Id.
48. Id. at 917 n.18.
49. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
50. Id. First, the Court found that the rule's application would have little deterrent
effect on police officers' actions. Id. Second, the Court concluded that no evidence
suggested legislators were engaged in lawlessness enough to require exclusion. Id. at 351.
Although legislators were not neutral judicial officers like judges or magistrates, they were
not law enforcement officers either. Id. at 350-51. Rather, like judicial officers, legislators
were not "'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" Id. at 351
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
Third, the Court reasoned
that legislators enacted statutes for broad pragmatic purposes. Id. at 352. In turn, the
greatest deterrent to a legislature's enactment of unconstitutional statutes remained the
judicial power of the courts to invalidate the statutes because invalidation would
subsequently: (1) inform the legislature of its error; (2) affect the admissibility of all the
evidence seized after the constitutional ruling; and (3) often result in the enactment of a
modified version of the statute that was constitutional. Id.
51. Id. at 349-51.
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exception to the exclusionary rule. After applying the analysis in Leon,
the Court answered in the affirmative.52 First, the Court concluded
that the rule's application to court employee clerical errors would not
alter police officers' behavior.5" It quoted the trial court: "'I think the
police officer [was] bound to arrest. I think he would [have been]
derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest.'"' Second, the Court found
no evidence suggesting that court personnel were engaged in lawlessness
or were inclined to subvert or disregard the Fourth Amendment. 5 In
fact, the Court pointed to contrary evidence. It emphasized the Chief
Clerk's testimony that the type of error affecting Evans rarely occurred."' Third, the Court reasoned court personnel would not be
significantly deterred from error by the threat of exclusion. 7 Court
employees were not law enforcement team adjuncts." They were not
"engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime " " and
thus had no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.' °
Because the police officers could have objectively and reasonably relied
upon the erroneous computer records, the Court concluded that the
application of Leon supported an exception to the exclusionary rule.6
Hence, the Court carved out another good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.
The implications of Arizona v. Evans 2 for future Fourth Amendment
controversies may prove more far reaching than expected. If read
broadly, Evans suggests that the good-faith exception could be expanded

52. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194.
53. Id. at 1193. Before applying the Leon analysis, the Court noted that the question
of whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights were violated had, for a long time,
been regarded as completely separate from the question of whether exclusion was
appropriate. Id. at 1191 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1982)). The Court
continued, stating that the exclusionary rule was a judicially created remedy which,
through its general deterrent effect, was designed to safeguard against future Fourth
Amendment violations. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906). The Court
further pointed out that exclusion had been limited only to cases where the remedial
objectives were determined to be served in the most effectual manner. Id.
54. Id. (quoting State v. Evans, No. CR-91-00513, at 51 (Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa
County 1992) (brackets in original)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1193-94.
57. Id. at 1193.

58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1194.

62. Id.
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to apply to circumstances in which no warrant or statute ever existed."
Before applying the exception, the Court in Leon expressed a strong
preference for a warrant." It found that an independent and impartial
magistrate provides a "more reliable safeguard against improper
searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer." 5
Thus, the Court stated, "'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under
a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall."'6 A
statute may likewise be preferred by the Court before applying the goodfaith exception. Legislators, who take an oath to protect the Constitution, may provide a more reliable safeguard than the hurried judgment
of police officers. However, in Evans, police did not act either on the
basis of a statute that was ultimately found unconstitutional, nor on the
basis of a warrant later invalidated for lack of probable cause. 7 When
police arrested Evans, the misdemeanor warrant was nonexistent. The
independent and impartial magistrate did not safeguard Evans' rights
because the magistrate's decision to quash the warrant was never
communicated to the police." Yet, the Court still applied the goodfaith exception. Additionally, in the wake of Evans, future Fourth
Amendment violations are virtually guaranteed to multiply in number.
In both Leon and Krull, the Court specifically noted that more effective
alternative safeguards were already in existence. In Leon, the Court
pointed to district court supervision and the threat of removal for
misconduct or incompetency.6 " The Court in Krull emphasized the
judicial power to invalidate unconstitutional statutes. 0 The Court's
analysis in Evans, however, was devoid of any such discussion. Instead,
the Court relied upon the chief clerk's testimony that the type of error

63. Cf. 115 S. Ct. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating, "The reasoning in Leon
assumed the existence of a warrant; it was, and remains, wholly inapplicable to
warrantless searches and seizures" (footnote ommitted)); State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 971
(Ariz. 1994) (rejecting extension of Leon's good-faith exception to searches based upon a
nonexistent warrant), rev'd sub nom. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
64. 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
65. Id. at 913-14.
66. Id. at 914 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)).
67. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194.
68. Major Masterton, A New Expansionof the Good-FaithException: Arizona v. Evans,

1995-JUL ARMY LAW. 56, 57. Masterton notes:
Arguably, the original decision by a justice of the peace to issue an arrest warrant
provided the accused an adequate safeguard. However, the Supreme Court did
not focus on this original warrant. Instead, the Court focused on who was
responsible for the failure to communicate that the warrant had been quashed.
Id. at 58 n.98.
69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 49.
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concerning Evans occurred only once in three or four years.7 At the
same time, the Court ignored testimony to the contrary. The witness
also recounted that when the mistake came to light, a subsequent
records check revealed three other mistakes had been made on the very
same day.72 As governmental reliance upon computer technology
increases, the number of databases containing similar inaccuracies will
multiply. As a result of Evans, these inaccuracies "now will inure to the
benefit of the police"73 and to the detriment of civil liberties. Absent
the threat of exclusion, effective incentives to safeguard against
negligent maintenance of computerized records no longer exist.7 4
Negligent maintenance may even be encouraged. Careless record
keeping provides law enforcement officers broader authority to conduct
unlawful searches and arrests. 5 It is unclear "how far, in dealing with
fruits of computerized error, [the Court's] very concept of deterrence by
exclusion of evidence [will] extend ... on [grounds] that there would
otherwise be no reasonable expectation of keeping the number of
resulting false arrests within an acceptable minimum limit."76 For the
most part, Evans leaves this issue unanswered. However, Evans
suggests the Court would apply the exclusionary rule to future computer
errors after determining arresting officers acted unreasonably in relying
upon the record keeping system itself.7 Unfortunately, just how many
Fourth Amendment violations will have to occur before a system is
deemed unreliable remains unknown. Arizona v. Evans by no means
eradicates the exclusionary rule. Instead, it leaves many pondering how
much of the rule's foundation and structure, first established in Weeks
and Mapp, still remains. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg expressed such

71. Evans, 115 S Ct. at 1200 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72. Id.

73. Ira Mickenberg, Court Settles on Narrower View of the FourthAmendment, NAT'L
L.J., July 31, 1995, at C8.
74. Id. "Under Evans, a police officer who reasonably relies on computer information
is immune from civil liability from any constitutional violation that may result." Id. See
also John R. Williams, Representing Plaintiffs in Civil Rights Litigation Under Section

1983, 530 PRAC. L. INST./LITIG. 29 (1995). Williams cites Evans as a reason for courts to
be more generous in imposing civil liability under Section 1983 stating, "What other
restraint will there be[,] ... [o]r should computers be above the law?" Id.

75. Id.
76. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Souter, J., concurring) (declining to answer the question).
77. See id. at 1194 (stating, "There is no indication that the arresting officer was not
acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record"); see also id.
(O'Conner, J., concurring) (explaining that it would not be reasonable for police to rely upon

a computer system that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that
routinely leads to false arrests).
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Even Justices O'Conner, Souter, and
concerns in their dissents.7
Breyer in their concurrences were poignantly clear that they supported
only a "narrow"" or "limit[ed]'" reading of the Court's opinion. Still,
with every new decision striking down an exclusionary rule's rationale
or carving out a new exception, the Court's distaste for the rule becomes
more apparent. s Some commentators argue that when "[flaced with
a severe societal problem [such as] crime, the [Court has] allowed
outcomes rather than jurisprudential principles and cogent analysis to
guide [its] decision making." 2 As violent crime plagues even the most
provincial parts of the country, the Court's direction reflects much of
today's public opinion. Citizens are lobbying for more prisons and
tougher sentences. Law enforcement officers are expressing frustration
with "the system." Congress is scrambling to pass legislation to create
a statutory good-faith exception.8 3 Yet today's society, "in attempting
to fight crime so that innocent citizens can feel free to pursue happiness,
may unwittingly be creating a world where no citizen has the unintruded upon liberty that the drafters of our Constitution surely envisioned."'
SARA GILIBERT

78. Justice Stevens stated, "The offense to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested,
handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because some bureaucrat has failed to
maintain an accurate computer data base strikes me as ... outrageous." Id. at 1197
(Stevens, J., dissenting). "Even when the error leads to the discovery of a crime, the cost
of exclusion must still be weighed against the interest in protecting innocent citizens from
unwarranted indignity." Id. Stevens concluded, "the cost is amply offset by an
appropriately 'jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of individual rights.'" Id.
(quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961)). Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice
Stevens joined, explained, "this Court should select a jurisdictional presumption that
encourages States to explore different means to secure respect for individual rights in
modem times." Id. at 1200-01 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1195 (Souter, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 1194 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
81. Christine M. D'Elia, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule: Who Does it Punish?, 5
SETON HALL CoNsT. L.J. 563, 607 (1995).
82. Michelle R. Ghetti, Seizure Through the Looking Glass: ConstitutionalAnalysis in
Alice's Wonderland, 22 S.U. L. REV. 231, 232 (1995) (footnote omitted).
83. See Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995, 141 Cong. Rec. S173-01, S278.
84. Ghetti, supra note 82, at 232 (emphasis omitted).

